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On the existence of financial equilibrium when beliefs are private
Lionel de Boisde¤re,1
(September 2012)
Abstract
We consider a pure exchange nancial economy, where agents, possibly asym-
metrically informed, face an exogenous uncertainty, on the future state of nature,
and an endogenous uncertainty, on the future price in each random state. Namely,
every agent forms private price anticipations on every prospective market, distrib-
uted along an idiosyncratic probability law. At a sequential equilibrium, all agents
expect the true price as a possible outcome and elect optimal strategies at the rst
period, which clear on all markets at every time period. We show that, provided the
endogenous uncertainty is large enough, a sequential equilibrium exists under stan-
dard conditions for all types of nancial structures and information signals across
agents. This result suggests that standard existence problems of sequential equilib-
rium models, following Hart (1975), stem from the perfect foresight assumption.
Key words: sequential equilibrium, temporary equilibrium, perfect foresight, exis-
tence, rational expectations, nancial markets, asymmetric information, arbitrage.
JEL Classication: D52
1 Université Paris 1, Centre dEconomie de la Sorbonne, 106-112 Boulevard de
lHôpital, 75013 Paris, France. Email: lionel.de-boisde¤re@univ-paris1.fr
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1 Introduction
The traditional approach to sequential nancial equilibrium relies on Radners
(1972-1979) classical, but restrictive, assumptions that agents have the so-called
rational expectations of private information signals, and perfect foresight of future
prices. Along the former assumption, agents are endowed, quoting Radner, with
a model of how equilibrium prices are determined and (possibly) infer private
information of other agents from comparing actual prices and price expectations
with theoretical values at a price revealing equilibrium. Along the latter, agents
anticipate with certainty exactly one price for each commodity (or asset) in each
prospective state, which turns out to be the true price if that state prevails. Both
assumptions presume much of agents inference capacities. Both assumptions lead to
classical cases of inexistence of equilibrium, as shown by Radner (1979), Hart (1975),
Momi (2000), Busch-Govindan (2004), among others. Building on our earlier papers,
we show hereafter that the relevance and properties of the sequential equilibrium
model can jointly be improved, if we drop these standard assumptions.
In a rst model [4], dropping rational expectations only, we provided the basic
tools, concepts and properties for an arbitrage theory, embedding jointly the sym-
metric and asymmetric information settings. In this model, we showed in [6], stan-
dard existence problems of asymmetric information vanished, namely, a nancial
equilibrium with nominal assets existed, not only generically - as in Radners (1979)
rational expectations model - but under the very same no-arbitrage condition, with
symmetric or asymmetric information, namely under the generalized no-arbitrage
condition introduced in [4]. This result was consistent with and (partially) extended
Cass (1984) standard existence theorem to the asymmetric information setting.
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In a second model [7], dropping both the rational expectation and perfect fore-
sight hypothesis, we extended the above model of asymmetric information to one
with all kinds of assets, where agents could forecast future prices with some pri-
vate uncertainty. This new model embeds both Cornet-de Boisde¤res (2002) and
(2009), and their main results, as particular application cases, but is innite dimen-
sional and more general. It introduces the basic tools and properties for an arbitrage
theory, when agents have asymmetric information and private idiosyncratic price ex-
pectations. These concepts and properties generalize Cornet-de Boisde¤res (2002-
2009). In particular, the innite model displays what information current prices
may reveal about the future, to agents having no clue of how equilibrium prices
are determined, hence, being prone to uncertainty between (typically) uncountable
forecasts. The model shows that no-arbitrage prices, observed on markets, always
convey enough information to free markets from arbitrage, after a nite number of
inference steps. Then, agents updated beliefs are said to be revealed by prices.
Formally, the latter model is a two-period pure exchange economy, where agents,
possibly asymmetrically informed, face an exogenous uncertainty, represented by -
nitely many random states of nature, exchange consumption goods on spot markets,
and (nominal or real) securities on nancial markets, so as to transfer wealth across
periods and states. At the rst period, besides the above exogenous uncertainty,
agents may face an endogenous uncertainty on the future price, in each state they
expect. That is, consumers have private sets of price anticipations, distributed along
idiosyncratic probability laws, called beliefs. This uncertainty on prices is said to
be endogenous, because it may a¤ect and is focussed on the endogenous variables.
The latter model of [7] is dealt with throughout this paper. Its equilibrium no-
tion, or correct foresight equilibrium (C.F.E.), is reached when all agents anticipate
2
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the true price as a possible outcome, and elect optimal strategies, which clear on all
markets, ex post. This equilibrium is, indeed, a sequential one, i.e., di¤ers from the
temporary equilibrium notion, introduced by Hicks (1939) and developed by Grand-
mont (1977, 1982), Green (1973), Hammond (1983), Balasko (2003), among others,
in which agents need not anticipate prices correctly at the outset, and may need
revise their plans and beliefs, ex post. Building on the arbitrage theory developed
in [7], the purpose of the paper is to study the existence conditions of the C.F.E.,
and to show this concept may bring a response to classical existence problems, fol-
lowing, not only Radners (1979) rational expectations equilibrium - which we had
shown in [6] already, but also Hart (1975), Momi (2001), Busch-Govindan (2004), in
particular. We prove that a C.F.E. exists whenever agents anticipations embed a
so-called minimum uncertainty set , presented hereafter. If required, agents beliefs
at the C.F.E. may be revealed (in the above sense) by the equilibrium price itself.
The paper is organized as follows: we present the model, in Section 2, the min-
imum uncertainty set and existence Theorems, in Section 3, and the Theorems
proof, in Section 4. An Appendix proves technical Lemmas.
2 The basic model
In this Section, we recall the framework and results of the model we had intro-
duced in [7], to which we refer the reader for more details. This model describes
a pure-exchange economy with two periods (t 2 f0; 1g), a commodity market and
a nancial market. At t = 0, agents may be asymmetrically informed and uncer-
tain of future prices; and they are also uncertain of the state of nature, which
will randomly prevail tomorrow. The sets of agents, I := f1; :::;mg, commodities,
L := f1; :::; Lg, states of nature, S, and nancial assets, J := f1; :::; Jg, are all nite.
3
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2.1 The models notations
Throughout, we denote by  the scalar product and k:k the Euclidean norm on
an Euclidean space and by B(K) the Borel sigma-algebra of a topological space, K.
We let s = 0 be the non-random state at t = 0 and S 0 := f0g[S. For all set   S 0
and tuple (s; l; x; x0; y; y0) 2 LRRRLRL, we denote by:
F xs 2 R, ys 2 R
L the scalar and vector, indexed by s 2 , of x, y, respectively;
F yls the l
th component of ys 2 R
L;
F x 6 x0 and y 6 y0 (respectively, x << x0 and y << y0) the relations xs 6 x
0
s
and yls 6 y
0l
s (resp., xs < x
0
s and y
l
s < y
0l
s ) for each (l; s) 2 f1; :::; Lg;
F x < x0 (resp., y < y0) the joint relations x 6 x0, x 6= x0 (resp., y 6 y0, y 6= y0);
F RL+ = fx 2 R
L : x > 0g and R+ := fx 2 R
 : x > 0g,
R
L
++ := fx 2 R
L : x >> 0g and R++ := fx 2 R
 : x >> 0g,
F M0 := f(p0; q) 2 R
L
+R
J : kp0k+ kqk = 1g;
F Ms := f(s; ps) : ps 2 R
L
+; kpsk = 1g, whenever s 2 S, and M := [s2SMs.
2.2 The commodity and asset markets
The L consumption goods, l 2 L, may be exchanged by consumers, on the spot
markets of both periods. In each state, s 2 S, an expectation of a spot price, p 2 RL+,
or the spot price, p, in state s itself, are denoted by the pair !s := (s; p) 2 SRL+, and
normalized, at little cost, to the above set Ms.
Each agent, i 2 I, is granted an endowment, ei := (eis) 2 RLS
0
+ , which secures her
the commodity bundle, ei0 2 RL+ at t = 0, and eis 2 R
L
+, in each state s 2 S, if this
state prevails at t = 1. To simplify notations, we will also denote ei! := eis, for every
4
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triple (i; s; !) 2 I  S0 Ms. Ex post, the generic ith agents welfare is measured by a
continuous utility index, ui : R2L+ ! R+, over her consumptions at both dates.
The nancial market permits limited transfers across periods and states, via J
assets, or securities, j 2 J := f1; :::; Jg, which are exchanged at t = 0 and pay o¤, in
commodities and/or in units of account, at t = 1. For any spot price, or expectation,
! 2 M, the cash payo¤s, vj(!) 2 R, of all assets, j 2 f1; :::; Jg, conditional on the
occurence of price !, dene a row vector, V (!) = (vj(!)) 2 RJ . By denition and
from the continuity of the scalar product, the mapping ! 2M 7! V (!) is continuous.
The nancial structure may be incomplete, namely, the span, < (V (!s))s2S > :=
f(V (!s)  z)s2S : z 2 RJg may have lower rank (for all prices (!s) 2 s2S Ms) than #S.
From above, assets provide no insurance against endogenous uncertainty.
Agents can take unrestrained positions (positive, if purchased; negative, if sold),
in each security, which are the components of a portfolio, z 2 RJ . Given an asset
price, q 2 RJ , a portofolio, z 2 RJ , is thus a contract, which costs q z units of account
at t = 0, and promises to pay V (!)  z units tomorrow, for each spot price ! 2 M, if
! obtains. Similarly, we normalize rst period prices, !0 := (p0; q), to the set M0.
2.3 Information and beliefs
Consistently with [4], each agent receives a private information signal, Si  S,
during the rst period, which informs her that the true state, i.e., that which will
prevail at t = 1, will be in Si. Henceforth, the collection, (Si), of all agents signals is
set as given and we let S := \mi=1Si. Agents are correctly informed, in the sense that
no state of S n S will prevail. They form and may update their private anticipations of
future spot prices in each state they expect, and these anticipations are distributed
along idiosyncratic probability laws, called beliefs. Formally, we recall from [7]:
5
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Denition 1 For all probability , on (M;B(M)), and pair (! := (s; p); ") 2MR++, we
let B(!; ") := f(s0; p0) 2M : kp0 pk+js0 sj < "g and P () := f! 2M : (B(!; ")) > 0;8" > 0g
be a compact set, whose elements are called anticipations, expectations or forecasts.
A probability, , on (M;B(M)), is called a belief if the relation P ()  S  RL++
holds (hence, " := inf(l;(s;ps))2LP () p
l
s > 0). We denote by B the set of all beliefs. A
belief, 0 2 B, is said to rene  2 B, and we denote it by 0  , if P (0)  P ().
Two beliefs, (; 0) 2 B2, are said to be equivalent, and we denote it by 0  , if
P (0) = P (), and we let
o
 := f 2 B :   g be their (common) equivalence class.
We denote by CB := f
o
 :  2 Bg the set of classes, forming a partition, of B, and by
P (
o
) the expectation support of any class
o
 2 CB, namely, the set of anticipations,
P (
o
) := P (), which is common to all beliefs  2
o
, and which characterizes
o
. We
say that a class,
o
0 2 CB, renes
o
 2 CB, and denote it by
o
0 
o
, if P (
o
0)  P (
o
).
A collection of beliefs, (i) 2 Bm, is called a structure (of beliefs), and we denote it
by (i) 2 SB, if the following condition holds:
(a) \mi=1P (i) 6= ?, i.e., the common anticipation set is non-empty.
Similarly, a collection of classes, (
o
i) 2 CB
m, is called a class structure (of beliefs),
and we denote it by (
o
i) 2 CSB, if \mi=1P (
o
i) 6= ?.
Let ((i); (0i)) 2 SB
2, (
o
i) 2 CSB and payo¤ mapping, V , be given. The couples, [V; (i)]
and [V; (
o
i)], are called, respectively, a structure and a class structure (of payo¤s and
beliefs). The structure (0i) is said to rene (i), and we denote it by (
0
i)  (i), if
the relations 0i  i hold for each i 2 I. The two structures are equivalent, and we
denote it by (i)  (0i), if both relations (i)  (
0
i) and (
0
i)  (i) hold. A renement,
(i ) 2 SB, of (i) 2 SB, is said to be self-attainable if the following Condition holds:
(b) \mi=1P (

i ) = \
m
i=1P (i), i.e., the common anticipation set is left unchanged.
The notions of renement and self-attainable renement are dened alike on CSB.
6
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Remark 1 We notice that a class of beliefs identies to a set of anticipations
(not yet ordered by a probability distribution, i.e., by a belief) and a class structure
identies to a collection of anticipations, some of which are common to all agents.
Though it is not required for the arbitrage theory we present in Section 2, and,
hence, not stated as a condition in the above Denition, we will restrict, in the
subsequent Sections 3 and 4, agents beliefs, (i) 2 SB, to be consistent with the
information signals they receive during the rst period, that is, restrict beliefs to
satisfy P (i) \Ms = ?, for every pair (i; s) 2 I  SnSi. This rationality assumption
may also be made in the following sub-Section 2.4, but it is not required, formally.
2.4 Consumers behavior and the notion of equilibrium
In Section 3, we recall from [7] how agents may rene their anticipations from
observing markets in this model. Hereafter, we assume that agents implement their
decisions after having reached their (nal) structure of beliefs, (i) 2 SB, and ob-
served the market price, !0 := (p0; q) 2 M0, at t = 0, which are set as given and re-
ferred to throughout. We also assume that, by the time agents trade, markets have
eliminated redundant assets, in the sense that no non-zero portfolio, z 2 RJnf0g, is
left, which yields an agent (say, i 2 I) no payo¤ at all, that is, V (!)  z = 0, for every
! 2 P (i). Then, the generic ith agents consumption set,
X(i) := C (P
0(i); RL+) ,
is the set of continuous mappings from P 0(i) := f0g[P (i) to RL+. A consumption,
x 2 X(i), is, thus, a mapping, relating s = 0 to a (xed) consumption decision,
x0 := x!0 2 R
L
+, at t = 0, and, continuously in ! 2 P (i), every anticipation, ! :=
(s; p) 2 P (i), of the spot price to a random consumption decision, x! 2 RL+, at t = 1,
which is conditional on the joint occurence of state s and spot price p at t = 1.
7
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Each agent i 2 I elects and implements a consumption and investment decision,
or strategy, (x; z) 2 X(i)RJ , that she can a¤ord on markets, given her endowment,
ei 2 R
LS0
+ , and her expectation set, P (i). This denes her budget set as follows:
Bi(!0; i) := f(x; z) 2 X(i)R
J : p0(x0 ei0) 6  qz; ps(x! ei!) 6 V (!)z;8! := (s; ps) 2 P (i)g
.
An allocation, (xi) 2 X[(i)] := mi=1X(i), is a collection of consumptions across
consumers. We dene the following set of attainable allocations:
A((!s); (i)) := f(xi) 2 X[(i)] :
Pm
i=1(xi0 ei0) = 0;
Pm
i=1(xi!s ei!s) = 0; 8s 2 S; s:t: !s 2 \
m
i=1P (i)g ,
for every price collection, (!s) := (!s)s2S 2 s2SMs. Each agent i 2 I has prefer-
ences represented by the V.N.M. utility function:
uii : x 2 X(i) 7! u
i
i (x) :=
R
!2P (i) ui(x0; x!)di(!).
The generic ith agent elects a strategy, which maximises her utility function in
the buget set, i.e., a strategy of the set Bi (!0; i) := argmax(x;z)2Bi(!0;i) u
i
i (x). The
above economy is denoted by E . Its equilibrium concept is dened as follows:
Denition 2 A collection of prices, (!s) 2 s2S0Ms, beliefs, (i) 2 SB, and strategies,
(xi; zi) 2 Bi(!0; i), dened for each i 2 I, is a correct foresight equilibrium (C.F.E.),
or a sequential equilibrium (respectively, a temporary equilibrium) of the economy
E, if the following Conditions (a)-(b)-(c)-(d) (resp., Conditions (b)-(c)-(d)) hold:
(a) 8s 2 S, !s 2 \mi=1P (i);
(b) 8i 2 I; (xi; zi) 2 B

i (!0; i) := argmax(x;z)2Bi(!0;i) u
i
i (x);
(c) (xi) 2 A((!s); (i));
(d)
Pm
i=1 zi = 0.
Under above conditions, (i) 2 SB, or (!s) 2 s2S0Ms, are said to support equilibrium.
8
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2.5 The models no-arbitrage prices and the information they reveal
We recall from [7] the denitions of arbitrage-free prices, beliefs, and structures.
Denition 3 Let a class structure of payo¤s and beliefs, [V; (
o
i)], a class of beliefs,
o
 2 CB, a representative belief,  2
o
, and a price, q 2 RJ , be given. The couples,
(V;
o
) or (V; ), are said to to be q-arbitrage-free (hence, arbitrage-free), or q to be a
no-arbitrage price of (V;
o
), or (V; ), if the following equivalent Conditions hold:
(a) there is no portfolio z 2 RJ , such that  q  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0 for every
! 2 P () = P (
o
), with at least one strict inequality;
(b) there exists a continuous mapping  : P ()! R++, such that q =
R
!2P () (!)V (!)d(!).
We let Q[V;
o
] be the set of no-arbitrage prices of (V;
o
) (or (V; )) and Qc[V; (
o
i)] :=
\mi=1Q[V;
o
i] be the set of common no-arbitrage prices of [V; (
o
i)]. The class structure
[V; (
o
i)] is said to be arbitrage-free (resp., q-arbitrage-free) if Qc[V; (
o
i)] 6= ? (resp.,
if q 2 Qc[V; (
o
i)]).We say that q is a no-arbitrage price (resp., a self-attainable no-
arbitrage price) of [V; (
o
i)] if there exists a renement (resp., a self-attainable rene-
ment), (
o


i )  (
o
i), such that q 2 Qc[V; (
o


i )], and we denote their set by Q[V; (
o
i)],
which is non-empty. All above denitions and notations can be stated, equiva-
lently, in terms of any representative structure, (i) 2 mi=1
o
i. We then refer to
Qc[V; (i)] := Qc[V; (
o
i)] and Q[V; (i)] := Q[V; (
o
i)] as, respectively, the sets of common
no-arbitrage prices, and no-arbitrage prices, of the structure [V; (i)]. When no con-
fusion arises, the reference to V is dropped in the above denitions and notations.
We now summarize, into the following Claim 1, the main results proved in [7].
Claim 1 Let (
o
i) 2 CSB and a price, q 2 RJ , be given. The following assertions hold:
(i) the class structure (
o
i) (or a structure, (i) 2 mi=1
o
i)) is arbitrage-free if and only
if there exist no portfolios (zi) 2 (RJ)I, such that
Pm
i=1 zi = 0 and V (!i)  zi > 0 for
9
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every couple (i; !i) 2 I  P (i) = I  P (
o
i), with at least one strict inequality;
(ii) there exists a unique coarsest arbitrage-free renement of (
o
i), denoted by
o
[V; (
o
i)]
or
o
[(
o
i)]. It is self-attainable. It is equal to (
o
i) if and only if (
o
i) is arbitrage-free;
(iii) for each i 2 I, there exists a set,
o
(V;
o
i; q) 2 ?[CB, also denoted by
o
(
o
i; q), and
said to be revealed by price q, which is empty, if and only if
o
i has no q-arbitrage-
free renement, and, otherwise, is the coarsest q-arbitrage-free renement of
o
i;
(iv) along assertion (iii), above, and Denition 1, the following relations hold:
( q 2 Q[(
o
i)], i.e., q is a no-arbitrage price) , ( (
o
(
o
i; q)) 2 CSB) , ( (
o
(
o
i; q))  (
o
i))
, ( (
o
(
o
i; q)) is the coarsest q-arbitrage-free renement of (
o
i)).
When such conditions hold, the renement, (
o
(
o
i; q)), is said to be revealed by price
q. A renement is said to be price revealable if it can be revealed by some price.
(v) ? 6= fq 2 RJ :
o
[(
o
i)] = (
o
(
o
i; q))g = Qc[V;
o
[(
o
i)]], that is, the coarsest renement,
o
[(
o
i)], is revealed by any of its common no-arbitrage prices;
(vi) (
o
(
o
i; q))  (
o
i) is self-attainable if and only if q 2 Q[(
o
i)] is self-attainable.
We now introduce and discuss a notion of minimum uncertainty on expectations,
when agents form their anticipations privately, and state our existence Theorem.
3 An uncertainty principle and the existence of equilibrium
3.1 The existence Theorem
When anticipations are private, there exists a set of minimum uncertainty on
future prices, any element of which is an equilibrium price for some structure.
Denition 4 Let an economy, E, as described in Section 2, be given and let A be its
set of sequential equilibria (i.e., of C.F.E.). The minimum uncertainty set, , of
this economy is the subset of [s2S Ms, whose elements support a C.F.E., that is:
 = f!s 2 [s2S Ms : 9((!s); (

i ); [(x

i ; z

i )]) 2 A; !s = !

s 2Msg.
10
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In Section 4, we prove that  is non-empty and that a continuum of equilibria
exists in standard conditions. Given this, the set  is typically uncountable. In the
economy, E , agents information and beliefs are private. So, each agent sees other
agents beliefs as (possibly arbitrary) elements of the set B. We retain the standard
small consumer, price-taker, hypothesis, which states that no single agents belief,
or strategy, may have a signicative impact on equilibrium prices. The economy, E ,
is said to be standard if, in addition to that hypothesis, it meets the Conditions:
F Assumption A1: 8i 2 I; ei >> 0;
F Assumption A2: 8i 2 I, ui is class C 1, strictly concave, strictly increasing.
Along Theorem 1, in any standard economy, E , the minimum uncertainty set,
, is non-empty and a C.F.E. exists, if each agents forecasts embed that set, .
Theorem 1 Let a standard economy, E, and a class structure, [V; (
o
i)], of payo¤s
and beliefs be given. Let  be the minimum uncertainty set of the economy E, along
Denition 4. Then, the following Assertions hold:
(i) 9" > 0 : 8p := (s; ) 2 , 8l 2 L, l > ";
(ii)  6= ?.
Consistently, with the above Assertions (i)-(ii), if the relation   \mi=1P (
o
i) holds,
that is, if every agents anticipations embed , then, the following Assertions hold:
(iii) if the class structure, [V; (
o
i)], is arbitrage-free, every representative structure of
beliefs, (i) 2 mi=1
o
i, supports a C.F.E.;
(iv) if a self-attainable renement, (
o


i ), of (
o
i), is arbitrage-free (and such a rene-
ment exists), every representative renement, (i ) 2 
m
i=1
o


i , supports a C.F.E.
(v) if (
o


i ) 2 CSB is a self-attainable price-revealable renement of (
o
i) (and such a
renement exists), then, every representative renement, (i ) 2 
m
i=1
o


i , supports a
C.F.E., which is price-revealed, i.e., revealed by the equilibrium price itself.
11
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Remark 3 Assertion (iv) of Theorem 1 is a direct Corollary of assertion (iii), from
replacing the structure [V; (
o
i)] by the arbitrage-free structure [V; (
o


i )]. We let the
reader check, as standard from Assumption A2, that if (i ) 2 SB and !0 := (p0; q) 2
M0 support a C.F.E., then, q 2 Qc[V; (i )]. Consequently, if that supporting structure,
(i ) 2 SB, is price-revealable, then, it is revealed by the equilibrium price, i.e., the
C.F.E. is price-revealed. Given this, Assertion (v) of Theorem 1 is a Corollary of
Assertion (iv) and only Assertions (i)-(ii)-(iii) need be proved.
Before discussing the Theorem Condition,   \mi=1P (
o
i), we prove Assertion (i).
Proof of Assertion (i) Let A and  be the sets of Denition 4, and s 2 S and
p := (s; ) 2  be given. From the denition, there exist prices, (!s) 2 s2S0Ms, beliefs,
(i) 2 SB, and strategies, [(xi; zi)] 2 mi=1 Bi(!0; i), such that C : = ((!s); (i); [(xi; zi)]) 2
A and p = !s. Let e := max(s;l)2S0L
Pm
i=1 e
l
is > 0 and C := sup
@ui
@yl
0 (x; y)=@ui@yl (x; y), for
(i; (x; y); (l; l0)) 2 I[0; e]2LL2, be given. Then, for each s 2 S0, the relations (xis) > 0
and
Pm
i=1(xis eis) = 0 hold, from Condition (c) of Denition 2 (applied to C), and
imply xis 2 [0; e]L, for each i 2 I. Moreover, the relations C 2 R++ and p 2 SRL++ are
standard fromAssumptionA2 and Condition (b) of Denition 2 (on C). Let (l; l0) 2 L2
be given. We show that 
l
l
0 6 C. Otherwise, it is standard, from Assumptions A1-
A2 and Conditions (b)-(c) of Denition 2 (applied to C), that there exist i 2 I
and x 2 X(i), identical to xi in every image, x! (for ! 2 f0g [ P (i)), but two,
xl
0
p := x
l0
ip+
E
l
0 and xlp := x
l
ip 
E
l
(for E 2 R++ small enough), such that (x; zi) 2 Bi(!0; i)
and uii (x) > u
i
i (xi), which contradicts the fact that C meets the Condition (b) of
Denition 2. We let the reader check the joint relations  >> 0, kk = 1 and 
l
l
0 6 C,
which hold, from above, for each (l; l0) 2 L2, imply l > " := 1
C
p
L
, for every l 2 L. 
Referring the reader to [7] for the models renement of information process, we
now discuss the Theorems condition, namely, the uncertainty principle it embeds.
12
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3.2 Discussing the Theorems Condition
The Theorems Condition,   \mi=1P (
o
i), is consistent with the models assump-
tion of price-takers agents seeing other consumers beliefs as arbitrary: then, 
is seen as the set of all possible equilibrium prices. It is also consistent with the
no-arbitrage condition with asymmetric beliefs, i.e., with anticipations precluding
arbitrage (see below). From Theorem 1, the Condition is su¢cient for the existence
of a C.F.E. It may also be a necessary condition, if beliefs are unpredictable and
erratic enough to let any price in  become a possible outcome. This situation may
arise in times of enhanced uncertainty and volatility. Then, the equilibrium is, typ-
ically, non-cooperative. Contrarily, if agents co-operate and share rened beliefs,
they might reach a nest sequential equilibrium, which exists from Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 Let a standard economy, E, and a class structure of payo¤s and beliefs,
[V; (
o
i)], be given, such that   \mi=1P (
o
i). Then, there exists a nest symmetric re-
nement, (
o


i )  (
o
i), such that:
(i) every representative renement, (i ) 2 
m
i=1
o


i , supports a C.F.E.
Proof We assume that Theorem 1 holds and, non restrictively, that [V; (
o
i)], is
such that P (
o
i) = , for each i 2 I (hence, arbitrage-free). Let R(oi) 6= ? be the
set of symmetric renements of (
o
i), which satisfy Condition (i) of Theorem 2. Let
f(
o

k
i )gk2K 2 R
K
(
o
i)
be a chain, k := P (
o

k
i ), for every (i; k) 2 I K, and 
 := \k2Kk.
As an intersection of a chain of compact sets,  is a compact set, hence, non-
empty. Let (
o
0i)  (
o
i) be the symmetric renement dened by P (
o
0i) = 
, for every
i 2 I. We let the reader check by contraposition (as tedious and too long here), from
similar arguments as for Lemmas 3-4 (see the Appendix), that (
o
0i) 2 R(oi)
, whereas
(
o
0i)  (
o

k
i ) holds, for every k 2 K, by construction. Then, from Zorns Lemma, R(oi)
admits a minimal element, that is, the desired nest renement of Theorem 2. 
13
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An emprical justication of the Theorems Condition could be that relative prices
may be observed and analysed, on long time series, for virtually all types of uncer-
tainty, beliefs, price volatility, speculation, or stability, and past states of nature.
From the joint set of relative prices so observed, the set, , of all normalized equi-
librium prices, or a bigger set, might be inferred. Below, we hint at another possible
explanation, which is theoretical and could be addressed in a subsequent paper.
It is important to recall that agents have no price model in the economy E .
Their anticipations start from an initial class structure, (
o
i) 2 CSB, which may be
updated to a renement, (
o


i )  (
o
i), when they trade. With no price model, agents
can only infer from markets the information that arbitrage opportunities reveal. As
shown in [7], from assets payo¤s, such unsophisticated agents may always rene
their anticipations, in nitely many steps, up to a coarse, self-attainable, arbitrage-
free renement, (
o


i )  (
o
i), which (typically) is consistent with uncountably many
beliefs (those cannot be inferred). If (
o
i), is arbitrage-free, anticipations are kept
unchanged, that is, (
o


i ) = (
o
i). Our conjecture is that a similar renement process
as that of [7], through trade, exists on spot markets, in which  is a xed set of
no-arbitrage prices, that cannot be ruled out. Since arbitrage is limited by nite
endowments, agents may also forecast positive prices outside  at equilibrium.
Once inferred from arbitrage as above, the renement, (
o


i )  (
o
i), cannot be
narrowed down from observing prices at t = 0. Indeed, along Theorem 1, all possible
equilibrium prices at t = 0 are supported by renements, (i ) 2 
m
i=1
o


i , having the
same expectation supports, P (i ) = P (
o


i ), for each i 2 I. So, spot prices at t = 0 are
non-informative. This outcome is consistent with agents having no price model.
The model leaves room for individual di¤erences, but is also consistent with
agents sharing information (along, e.g., Theorem 2). In all cases, agents nal beliefs,
14
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say (i ) 2 SB, belong to same classes of beliefs ((

i ) 2 
m
i=1
o


i ), but remain private.
This privacy, agents xed expectations sets, (P (
o


i )), and the Theorems Condition
restore existence. Indeed, there can be no fall in rank problem a la Hart (1975).
The generic ith agents budget set and strategy are dened ex ante, with reference
to ex ante conditions, and a xed expectation set, P (
o


i ). So, only her ex ante
span of payo¤s matters, < V;
o


i > := f! 2 P (
o


i ) 7! V (!)  z : z 2 R
Jg, which is xed
independently of any (equilibrium) price, p 2   P (
o


i ), to the di¤erence of Hart.
4 The existence proof
Throughout, we set as given a standard economy, E , an arbitrage-free class
structure, [V; (
o
i)], a supporting structure of beliefs, (i) 2 mi=1
o
i, expectation sets,
(Pi) := (P (
o
i))i2I . Along Remark 3, we need only prove assertions (ii) and (iii) of
Theorem 1. The proofs principle is to construct a sequence of auxiliary economies,
with nite expectation sets, rening and tending to the initial expectations sets,
(Pi)i2I . Each nite economy admits an equilibrium along Theorem 1 of [6], which
we set as given. Then, from the sequence of nite dimensional equilibria, we derive
an equilibrium of the initial economy, E . To that aim, we introduce auxiliary sets.
4.1 Auxiliary sets
We divide Pi, for each i 2 I, in ever ner partitions, and let for each n 2 N:
Kn := fkn := (k
1
n; :::; k
L
n ) 2 (N \ [0; 2
n   1])Lg;
P(i;s;kn) := Pi \ (fsgl2f1;:::;Lg]
kln
2n ;
kln+1
2n ]), for every (s; kn := (k
1
n; :::; k
L
n )) 2 SiKn.
For each (i; s; n; kn) 2 ISiNKn, such that P(i;s;kn) 6= ?, we select g
n
(i;s;kn)
2 P(i;s;kn)
uniquely, and dene a set, Gni := fg
n
(i;s0;k0n)
: s0 2 Si; k0n 2 Kn; P(i;s0;k0n) 6= ?g, as follows:
15
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F for n = 0, we select one g0(i;s;0)2P(i;s;0), for all s 2 Si, and let G
0
i := fg
0
(i;s;0) : s 2 Sig;
F for n 2 N arbitrary, given Gn 1i := fg
n 1
(i;s;kn 1)
2 P(i;s;kn 1) : s 2 Si; kn 1 2 Kn 1g, we
let, for every (s; kn) 2 Si Kn, such that P(i;s;kn) 6= ?,
gn(i;s;kn)
8>><
>>:
be equal to gn 1(i;s;kn 1), if there exists (kn 1; g
n 1
(i;s;kn 1)
) 2 Kn 1Gn 1i \ P(i;s;kn)
be set fixed in P(i;s;kn); if 2 G
n 1
i \ P(i;s;kn) = ?
2
This yields a set, Gni := fg
n
(i;s;kn)
2 P(i;s;kn) : s 2 Si; kn 2 Kng, and, by induction, a
non-decreasing dense sequence, fGni gn2N, of subsets of Pi, with a good property:
Lemma 1 There exists N 2 N, such that the following Assertion holds:
(i) 8(
o


i )  (
o
i), (GNi  P (
o


i ), 8i 2 I)) (Qc[V; (
o


i )] 6= ?).
Proof see the Appendix. 
For every integer n > N along Lemma 1, and any element  2 ]0; 1], hereafter set
as given, we consider an auxiliary economy, En , which admits an equilibrium, C
n.
4.2 Auxiliary economies, En
We dene NN := N n f0; 1; :::; N   1g, along Lemma 1, and set as given, for each
s 2 S, an arbitrary spot price, !N 1s := (s; p
N 1
s ) 2Ms. Then, we dene, by induction
on n 2 NN , a sequence of prices, f(!ns )g 2 (s2S Ms)
NN , which are, for each n 2 NN ,
the second period equilibrium prices of the economy En , presented hereafter.
We now let n 2 NN be given and derive from the set, Gni , of sub-Section 4.1,
and prices, (!n 1s ) 2 s2S Ms, assumed to be dened at the last induction step,
an auxiliary economy, En , referred to as the (n; )-economy, which is of the type
described in [6]. Namely, it is a pure exchange economy, with two period (t 2 f0; 1g),
2 Non restrictively (up to a shift in the upper boundary of P(i;s;kn)), we assume that each g
n
(i;s;kn)
2 P(i;s;kn)
is in the interior of P(i;s;kn) 6= ?, to insure that i(P(i;s;kn)) > 0.
16
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m agents, having incomplete information, and exchanging L goods and J nominal
assets, under uncertainty (at t = 0) about which state of a nite state space, Sn, will
prevail at t = 1. Referring to [6], and to the above notations and denitions in the
economy E , the generic (n; )-economys characteristics are as follows:
F The information structure is the collection, (Sni ), of sets S
n
i := S [
eSni (and we
let S0ni := S
0 [ eSni ), such that eSni := figGni is dened for each i 2 I. The pooled
information set (of the states which may prevail at t = 1) is, hence, S = \i2ISni .
For each i 2 I, the set eSni := figGni consists of purely formal states, none of
which will prevail. The state space of the (n; )-economy is Sn = [i2ISni .
F The SnJ payo¤ matrix, V n := (V n(sn)), is dened, with reference to the payo¤
mapping, V , of the economy E, by V n(s) := V ((s; pn 1s )), for each s 2 S, and
V n(sn) := V (!), for each sn := (i; !) 2 Sn. The payo¤ matrix V n is purely nominal.
F In each formal state, sn := (i; (s; ps)) 2 eSni , the generic agent i 2 I is certain that
price ps 2 RL++, and only that price, can prevail on the s
n-spot market.
F In each realizable state, s 2 S, the generic agent i 2 I has perfect foresight, i.e.,
anticipates with certainty the true price, say pns 2 R
L
++ (or !
n
s := (s; p
n
s ) 2Ms).
F The generic ith agents endowment, eni := (e
n
isn) 2 R
LS0ni
++ , is dened (with reference
to ei in E) by enis := eis, for each s 2 S
0, and enisn := eis, for each s
n := (i; (s; ps)) 2 eSni .
F For every collection of the true market prices, !n0 := (p
n
0 ; q
n) 2 M0, at t = 0, and
!ns := (s; p
n
s ) 2 Ms, for all s 2 S, at t = 1, the generic i
th agent has the following
consumption set, Xni , budget set, B
n
i (S
n
i ; (!
n
s )), and utility function, u
n
i :
Xni := R
LS0ni
+ ;
Bni (S
n
i ; (!
n
s )) := {(x; z) 2 X
n
i R
J :
2
664
pn0 (x0 ei0) 6  q
nz and pns (xs eis) 6 V
n(s)z;8s 2 S
ps(xsn eis) 6 V
n(sn)z; 8sn := (i; (s; ps)) 2 eSni
};
17
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uni : x 7!
P
sn2Sn
i
ni (s
n)ui(x0; xsn),
where ni (s
n) := i(P(i;s;kn)), for every (s; kn; s
n) 2 Si Kn  (fig  [G
n
i \ P(i;s;kn)]), is the
probability of the set P(i;s;kn) 6= ?, along the belief i, and 
n
i (s) := , for each s 2 S.
Theorem 1 of [6] and Lemma 1 above yield Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The generic (n; )-economy admits an equilibrium, namely a collection
of prices, !n0 := (p
n
0 ; q
n) 2 M0, at t = 0, and !ns := (s; p
n
s ) 2 Ms, in each state s 2 S,
and strategies, (xni ; z
n
i ) 2 B
n
i (S
n
i ; (!
n
s )), dened for each i 2 I, such that :
(i) 8i 2 I; (xni ; z
n
i ) 2 argmax(x;z)2Bni (Sni ;(!ns )) u
n
i (x);
(ii) 8s 2 S0;
Pm
i=1 (x
n
is   eis) = 0;
(iii)
Pm
i=1 z
n
i = 0.
Moreover, the equilibrium prices and allocations satisfy the following Assertions:
(iv) 8(n; i; s) 2 NN  I  S
0, xnis 2 [0; e]
L, where e := max(s;l)2S0L
Pm
i=1 e
l
is;
(v) 9" 2]0; 1] : pnls > ", 8(n; s; l) 2 NN  S L.
Proof see the Appendix. 
Along Lemma 2, we set as given an equilibrium of the (n; )-economy, namely:
Cn := (!n0 := (p
n
0 ; q
n); (!ns ); [(x
n
i ; z
n
i )]) 2M0 s2S Ms 
m
i=1 B
n
i (S
n
i ; (!
n
s )),
which is always referred to. The equilibrium prices, (!ns ) 2 s2SMs, permit to pursue
the induction and dene the (n+1; )-economy in the same way as above, hence, the
auxiliary economies and equilibria at all ranks. These meet the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 For the above sequence, fCng, of equilibria, it may be assumed to exist:
(i) !0 := (p

0 ; q
) = limn!1 !n0 2M0 and !

s := (s; p

s) = limn!1 !
n
s 2Ms, for each s 2 S;
(ii) (xis) := limn!1 (x
n
is)i2I 2 R
Lm, such that
P
i2I (x

is   eis) = 0, for each s 2 S
0;
18
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(iii) (zi ) = limn!1(z
n
i )i2I 2 R
Jm, such that
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0.
Moreover, we dene, for each i 2 I, the following sets and mappings:
G1i := [n2NG
n
i = limn!1 % G
n
i  Pi;
for each n 2 N, the mapping, ! 2 Pi 7! argni (!) 2 G
n
i , from the relations
(!; argni (!)) 2 P
2
(i;s;kn)
, which hold (for every ! 2 Pi) for some (s; kn) 2 SiKn;
from Assertion (i) and Lemma 2-(v), the belief, i :=
1
1+#S (i + 
P
s2S Es),
where Es is (for each s 2 S) the Diracs measure of !s;
the support of i 2 B, denoted by P

i := P (

i ) = Pi [ f!

sgs2S;
for all (! := (s; ps); z) 2MRJ , the set Bi(!; z) := fx 2 RL+ : ps(x  eis) 6 V (!)zg.
Then, the following Assertions hold, for each i 2 I:
(iv) Gni  G
n+1
i , 8n 2 N, G
1
i = Pi and farg
n
i (!)gn2N converges to ! uniformly on Pi;
(v) 8s 2 S, fxisg = argmaxx2Bi(!s ;zi ) ui(x

i0; x), along Assertion (ii); we let x

i!

s
:= xis;
(vi) the correspondence ! 2 P i 7! argmaxx2Bi(!;zi ) ui(x

i0; x) is a continuous mapping,
denoted by ! 7! xi!. The mapping, x

i : ! 2 f0g [ P

i 7! x

i!, dened from Assertions
(ii) and (v) and above, is a consumption plan, henceforth referred to as xi 2 X(

i );
(vii) u


i
i (x

i ) =
1
1+#S limn!1 u
n
i (x
n
i ) 2 R+.
Proof see the Appendix. 
4.3 An equilibrium of the initial economy
We now prove Assertion (ii) of Theorem 1, via the following Claim.
Claim 2 The collection of prices, (!s) = limn!1(!
n
s ), beliefs, (

i ), allocation, (x

i ),
and portfolios, (zi ) = limn!1(z
n
i ), of Lemma 3, is a C.F.E. of the economy E .
Proof Let C := ((!s); (

i ); [(x

i ; z

i )]) be dened from Claim 2 and use the notations
of Lemma 3. From Lemma 3-(ii)-(iii)-(v)-(vi), C meets Conditions (c)-(d) of the above
Denition 2 of equilibrium. From the denition, f!sgs2S  \
m
i=1P (

i ), so C
 meets
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Condition (a) of Denition 2. To prove that C is a C.F.E., it su¢ces to show that
C satises the relation [(xi ; z

i )] 2 
m
i=1Bi(!

0 ; 

i ) and Condition (b) of Denition 2.
Let i 2 I be given. From the denition of Cn, the relations pn0 (x
n
i0-ei0) 6  q
nzni and
pns (x
n
is-eis) 6 V ((s; p
n 1
s ))z
n
i hold, for each (n; s) 2 NNS, which yield in the limit (from
the continuity of the scalar product): p0 (x

i0-ei0) 6  q
zi and p

s (x

is-eis) 6 V (!

s)z

i ,
for each s 2 S. The relations ps(x

i!-eis) 6 V (!)z

i hold, for all (s; ! := (s; ps)) 2 Si Pi,
from Lemma 3-(v)-(vi). This implies, from Lemma 3-(vi): [(xi ; z

i )] 2 
m
i=1Bi(!

0 ; 

i ).
Assume, by contraposition, that C fails to meet Denition 2-(b), then, there exist
i 2 I, (x; z) 2 Bi(!

0 ; 

i ) and " 2 R++, such that:
(I) "+ u


i
i (x

i ) < u


i
i (x).
We may assume that there exists E 2 R++, such that:
(II) xl! > E, for every (!; l) 2 f0g [ P

i  L.
If not, for every B 2 [0; 1], we dene the strategy (xB; zB) := ((1 B)x+Bei; (1 B)z),
which belongs to Bi(!

0 ; 

i ), a convex set. From Assumption A1, the strategy (x
B; zB)
meets relations (II) whenever B > 0. Moreover, from relation (I) and the uniform
continuity of (B; !) 2 [0; 1]  P i 7! ui(x
B
0 ; x
B
!) on a compact set (which holds from
Assumption A2 and the relation x 2 X(i )), the strategy (x
B; zB) also meets relation
(I), for every B > 0, small enough. So, we may assume relations (II).
We let the reader check, as immediate from the relations (x; z) 2 Bi(!

0 ; 

i ) and
i 2 B (and the denition of a belief), from Lemma 3-(i), the relations (I)   (II),
Assumption A2, and the same continuity arguments as above (and the continuity
of the scalar product), that we may also assume there exists D 2 R++, such that:
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(III) p0 (x0   ei0) 6 D   q
z and ps(x!   eis) 6 D + V (!)z, 8! := (s; ps) 2 P

i .
From (III), the continuity of the scalar product (hence, of ! 7! V (!)) and Lemma
3-(i)-(iii)-(iv), there exists N1 2 NN , such that, for every n > N1:
(IV )
2
6666664
pn0 (x0   ei0) 6  q
nz
pns (x!s   eis) 6 V
n(s)z; 8s 2 S
ps(x!   eis) 6 V (!)z; 8! := (s; ps) 2 G
n
i
.
Along relations (IV ) and Lemma 3-(i)-(v)-(vi), for each n > N1, we let (xn; z) 2
Bni (S
n
i ; (!
n
s )) be the strategy dened by x
n
0 := x0, x
n
s := x!s , for every s 2 S, and
xnsn := x!, for every s
n := (i; !) 2 eSni , and recall that:
F u


i
i (x) :=
1
1+#S
R
!2Pi ui(x0; x!)du
i
i (!) +

1+#S
P
s2S ui(x0; x!s );
F uni (x
n) :=
P
sn2Sn
i
nS ui(x0; xsn)
n
i (s
n) + 
P
s2S ui(x0; x!s ).
Then, from above, Lemma 3-(i)-(iv) and the uniform continuity of x 2 X(i ) and
ui on compact sets, there exists N2 > N1 such that (with C := (1+#S)):
(V ) jCu


i
i (x)-u
n
i (x
n)j 6
R
!2Pi jui(x0; x!)-ui(x0; xargni (!))jdu
i
i (!) <
"
2 , for every n > N2.
From equilibrium conditions and Lemma 3-(vii), there exists N3 > N2, such that:
(V I) uni (x
n) 6 uni (x
n
i ) <
"
2 + Cu


i
i (x

i ), for every n > N3 (with C := (1+#S)).
Let n > N3 be given. The above Conditions (I)-(V )-(V I) yield, jointly:
Cu


i
i (x) <
"
2 + u
n
i (x
n) < "+ Cu


i
i (x

i ) < Cu


i
i (x).
This contradiction proves that C meets Condition (b) of Denition 2, hence, from
above, that C is a C.F.E. The sets A, of C.F.E., and , of minimum uncertainty, of
Dention 4, which contains f!sgs2S, are non-empty, i.e., Theorem 1-(ii) holds. 
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Claim 3, below, completes the proof of Theorem 1 via the following Lemma.
Lemma 4 For each (i; k) 2 IN, we let k :=
1
2k
, denote simply uki := u

k
i
i and
by Ck = ((!ks); (
k
i ); [(x
k
i ; z
k
i )]) the related C.F.E., C
k, of Claim 2, and we dene the
set, Bi(!; z) := fx 2 RL+ : ps(x eis) 6 V (!)zg, for all (! := (s; ps); z) 2 PiR
J . Then,
whenever \mi=1Pi along Denition 4, the following Assertions hold for each i 2 I:
(i) for each s 2 S0, it may be assumed to exist prices, !s = limk!1 !
k
s 2Ms, such that
f!sgs2S  \
m
i=1Pi, and consumptions, x

is = limk!1 x
k
is, such that
P
i2I(x

is eis) = 0;
(ii) it may be assumed to exist portfolios, zi = limk!1 z
k
i , such that
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0;
(iii) 8s 2 S, fxisg = argmaxx2Bi(!s ;zi ) ui(x

i0; x) along Assertion (i); we let x

i!s
:= xis;
(iv) the correspondence ! 2 Pi 7! argmaxx2Bi(!;zi ) ui(x

i0; x) is a continuous mapping,
denoted by ! 7! xi!. The mapping x

i : ! 2 f0g [ Pi 7! x

i!, dened from Assertions
(i)-(iii) and above, is a consumption plan, referred to as xi 2 X(i);
(v) for every x 2 X(i), uii (x) = limk!1 u
k
i (x) 2 R+ and u
i
i (x

i ) = limk!1 u
k
i (x
k
i ) 2 R+.
Proof see the Appendix. 
Claim 3 Whenever   \mi=1Pi, the collection of prices, (!

s) = limk!1(!
k
s), beliefs,
(i), allocation, (xi ), and portfolios, (z

i ) = limk!1(z
k
i ), of Lemma 4, is a C.F.E.
Proof The proof is similar to that of Claim 2. We assume that   \mi=1Pi and
let C := ((!s); (i); [(x

i ; z

i )]) be dened from Lemma 4, whose notations will be used
throughout. Given (i; k) 2 I  N, the relations f!ksgs2S    \
m
i=1Pi hold from Claim
2, and imply that P (ki ) = Pi, hence, Bi(!

0; i) and Bi(!
k
0 ; 
k
i ) may only di¤er by
one budget constraint at t = 0. From Lemma 4, C meets Conditions (a)-(c)-(d) of
Denition 2. Moreover, for every (i; k) 2 I N, the relations pk0 (x
k
i0-ei0) 6  q
kzki hold,
from Claim 2, and, passing to the limit, yield p0(x

i0-ei0) 6  q
zi , which implies,
from Lemma 4-(iv) and above: (xi ; z

i ) 2 Bi(!

0; i), for each i 2 I. Thus, Claim 3 will
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be proved if we show that C meets Condition (b) of Denition 2. By contraposition,
assume this is not the case, i.e., there exists (i; (x; z); ") 2 IBi(!0; i)R++, such that:
(I) "+ uii (x

i ) < u
i
i (x).
From relation (x; z) 2 Bi(!0; i), Lemma 4-(i) and AssumptionsA1-A2, the relation:
(II) p0(x0-ei0) 6 D   q
z, for some D 2 R++, may also be assumed.
From (II), Lemma 4-(i), continuity arguments and the identity of Bi(!0; i) and
Bi(!
k
0 ; 
k
i ) on all second period budget constraints, there exists K 2 N, such that:
(III) (x; z) 2 Bi(!
k
0 ; i) = Bi(!
k
0 ; 
k
i ), for every k > K.
Relations (I)-(III), Lemma 4-(v) and the fact that Ck is a C.F.E., yield:
(IV ) uii (x) <
"
2 + u
k
i (x) 6
"
2 + u
k
i (x
k
i ) < "+ u
i
i (x

i ) < u
i
i (x), for k > K big enough.
This contradiction proves that C meets Denition 2-(b), i.e., is a C.F.E. From
Claim 2, Remark 3, the arbitrary choice of the arbitrage-free class structure, [V; (
o
i)],
and representative structure, (i) 2 mi=1
o
i, the proof of Theorem 1 is complete. 
Appendix: proof of the Lemmas
Lemma 1 There exists N 2 N, such that the following Assertion holds:
(i) 8(
o


i )  (
o
i), (GNi  P (
o


i ), 8i 2 I)) (Qc[V; (
o


i )] 6= ?).
Proof Let the arbitrage-free class structure, [V; (
o
i)], expectation sets, (Pi) := (P (
o
i)),
and sequences, f(Gni )gn2N, be dened as in Section 4. For each (i; n) 2 IN, we consider
the vector space Zni := fz 2 R
J : V (!)  z = 0;8! 2 Gni g and its orthogonal, Z
n?
i , and,
similarly, Zi := fz 2 R
J : V (!)  z = 0;8! 2 Pig and Z?i . We show, rst, that, for
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each i 2 I, there exists Ni 2 N, such that Zni = Z

i , for every n > Ni. Indeed, since
fGni gn2N is non-decreasing, fZ
n
i gn2N is non increasing in R
J , hence, stationary, that
is, there exists Ni 2 N, such that Zni = Z
Ni
i , for every n > Ni. From the denition,
Zi  Z
Ni
i . From the fact that limn!1 % G
n
i = [n2NG
n
i is dense in Pi, we easily show,
by contraposition, that Zi = Z
Ni
i (for all n > Ni, take zn 2 Z
?
i \ Z
n
i , such that
kznk = 1 and derive a contradiction). We let No = maxi2I Ni and dene the compact
set, Z := f(zi) 2 mi=1Z
?
i : k(zi)k = 1;
Pm
i=1 zi 2
Pm
i=1 Z

i g.
Assume, by contraposition, that Lemma 2 fails. Then, from Claim 1-(i) and
above, for every n > No, there exist an integer, Nn > n, expectation sets, (PNni ), such
that GNni  P
Nn
i  Pi, for each i 2 I, and portfolios, (z
n
i ) 2 Z, such that V (!i)  z
n
i > 0
holds for every (i; !i) 2 I  PNni , with one strict inequality. The sequence, f(z
n
i )gn>No,
may be assumed to converge in a compact set, say to (zi ) 2 Z. From the continuity
of the scalar product and the fact that, for each i 2 I, limn!1Gni = [n2NG
n
i is dense
in Pi, the above relations on f(zni )gn>No, imply, in the limit, that V (!i)  z

i > 0 holds,
for every (i; !i) 2 I  Pi, with one strict inequality, since (zi ) 2 Z. This contradicts
the fact that [V;
o
i] is arbitrage-free. This contradiction proves Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2 The generic (n; )-economy admits an equilibrium, namely a collection
of prices, !n0 := (p
n
0 ; q
n) 2 M0, at t = 0, and !ns := (s; p
n
s ) 2 Ms, in each state s 2 S,
and strategies, (xni ; z
n
i ) 2 B
n
i (S
n
i ; (!
n
s )), dened for each i 2 I, such that :
(i) 8i 2 I; (xni ; z
n
i ) 2 argmax(x;z)2Bni (Sni ;(!ns )) u
n
i (x);
(ii) 8s 2 S0;
Pm
i=1 (x
n
is   eis) = 0;
(iii)
Pm
i=1 z
n
i = 0.
Moreover, the equilibrium prices and allocations satisfy the following Assertions:
(iv) 8(n; i; s) 2 NN  I  S
0, xnis 2 [0; e]
L, where e := max(s;l)2S0L
Pm
i=1 e
l
is;
(v) 9" 2]0; 1] : pnls > ", 8(n; s; l) 2 NN  S L.
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Proof Let n 2 NN be given. From Lemma 1 and the fact that S is a set of common
states for all agents, the structure [V n; (Sni )] is arbitrage-free, along [6], on a purely
nancial market. Moreover, the (n; )-economy is, formally, one of the type presented
in [6] and, from above, admits an equilibrium along Denition 3 and Theorem 1 of
[6] and its proof, more precisely (up to a slight change in notations), it admits a
collection of prices, !n0 := (p
n
0 ; q
n) 2 M0, and !ns := (s; p
n
s ) 2 Ms, for each s 2 S, and
strategies, (xni ; z
n
i ) 2 B
n
i (S
n
i ; (!
n
s )), dened for each i 2 I, which satisfy Assertions (i)-
(ii)-(iii) of Lemma 2 (which, hence, hold). The proof of Assertions (iv)-(v) is similar
to that of Assertion (i) of Theorem 1, given above, and left to the reader. 
Lemma 3 For the above sequence, fCng, of equilibria, it may be assumed to exist:
(i) !0 := (p

0 ; q
) = limn!1 !n0 2M0 and !

s := (s; p

s) = limn!1 !
n
s 2Ms, for each s 2 S;
(ii) (xis) := limn!1 (x
n
is)i2I 2 R
Lm, such that
P
i2I (x

is   eis) = 0, for each s 2 S
0;
(iii) (zi ) = limn!1(z
n
i )i2I 2 R
Jm, such that
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0.
Moreover, we dene, for each i 2 I, the following sets and mappings:
G1i := [n2NG
n
i = limn!1 % G
n
i  Pi;
for each n 2 N, the mapping, ! 2 Pi 7! argni (!) 2 G
n
i , from the relations
(!; argni (!)) 2 P
2
(i;s;kn)
, which hold (for every ! 2 Pi) for some (s; kn) 2 SiKn;
from Assertion (i) and Lemma 2-(v), the belief, i :=
1
1+#S (i + 
P
s2S Es),
where Es is (for each s 2 S) the Diracs measure of !s;
the support of i 2 B, denoted by P

i := P (

i ) = Pi [ f!

sgs2S;
for all (! := (s; ps); z) 2MRJ , the set Bi(!; z) := fx 2 RL+ : ps(x  eis) 6 V (!)zg.
Then, the following Assertions hold, for each i 2 I:
(iv) Gni  G
n+1
i , 8n 2 N, G
1
i = Pi and farg
n
i (!)gn2N converges to ! uniformly on Pi;
(v) 8s 2 S, fxisg = argmaxx2Bi(!s ;zi ) ui(x

i0; x), along Assertion (ii); we let x

i!

s
:= xis;
(vi) the correspondence ! 2 P i 7! argmaxx2Bi(!;zi ) ui(x

i0; x) is a continuous mapping,
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denoted by ! 7! xi!. The mapping, x

i : ! 2 f0g [ P

i 7! x

i!, dened from Assertions
(ii) and (v) and above, is a consumption plan, henceforth referred to as xi 2 X(

i );
(vii) u


i
i (x

i ) =
1
1+#S limn!1 u
n
i (x
n
i ) 2 R+.
Proof Assertions (i)-(ii) result from Lemma 2-(iv) and compactness arguments. 
Assertion (iii) For all (i; n) 2 INN , we let Zi := fz 2 R
J : V (!)  z = 0;8! 2 Pig and
recall from the proof of Lemma 1 that Zi = fz 2 R
J : V (!)  z = 0;8! 2 Gni g. We show
that the portfolio sequence f(zni )i2Ig is bounded in R
Jm. Indeed, let E := maxi2I keik.
The denition of fCngn2NN yields, from budget constraints and clearance conditions:
(I) [
Pm
i=1 z
n
i = 0 and V (!i)z
n
i >  E, 8(i; !i) 2 I G
n
i ], for every n 2 NN .
Assume, by contradiction, f(zni )g is unbounded, i.e., there exists an extracted
sequence, f(z'(n)i )g, such that n < k(z
'(n)
i )k 6 n+1, for all n 2 NN . From (I), the
portfolios (zni ) :=
1
n
(z
'(n)
i ) meet, for all n 2 NN , the relations 1<k(z
n
i )k61+
1
n
and:
(II)
Pm
i=1 z
n
i = 0 and V (!i)z
n
i >  
E
n
, 8(i; !i) 2 I Gni .
From (II), the density of G1i in Pi, scalar product continuity and above, the
sequence f(zni )g may be assumed to converge, say to (zi), such that k(zi)k = 1 and:
(III)
Pm
i=1 zi = 0 and V (!i)zi > 0, 8(i; !i) 2 IPi.
Relations (III) and the fact that [V; (
o
i)] is arbitrage-free imply, from Claim 1,
(zi) 2 
m
i=1Z

i and, from the elimination of redundant assets (see sub-Section 2.4),
(zi) = 0, which contradicts the fact that k(zi)k = 1. Hence, the sequence f(zni )g is
bounded and may be assumed to converge, say to (zi ) 2 R
Jm. Then, the relation
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0 results asymptotically from clearance conditions in Lemma 2-(iv). 
Assertions (iv) is immediate from the denitions and compactness arguments. 
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Assertion (v) Let (i; s) 2 IS be given. For every (n; ! := (s; ps); !0; z) 2 NNMsMsRJ ,
we consider the following (possibly empty) sets:
Bi(!; z) := fy 2 R
L
+ : ps(y eis) 6 V (!)zg and B
0
i(!; !
0; z) := fy 2 RL+ : ps(y eis) 6 V (!
0)zg.
For each n > N , the fact that Cn is a (n; )-equilibrium implies, from Lemma 2:
(I) (!n 1s ; !
n
s ) 2M
2
s and x
n
is 2 argmaxy2B0
i
(!ns ;!
n 1
s ;z
n
i
) ui(x
n
i0; y).
As a standard application of Berges Theorem (see, e.g., [8], p. 19), the corre-
spondence (x; !; !0; z) 2 RL+MsMsR
J 7! argmaxy2B0
i
(!;!0;z) ui(x; y), which is actually
a mapping (from Assumption A2 ), is continuous at (xi0; !

s ; !

s ; z

i ), since ui and B
0
i
are continuous. Moreover, the relation (xi0; x

is; !

s ; z

i ) = limn!1(x
n
i0; x
n
is; !
n
s ; z
n
i ) holds
from Lemma 2-(i)-(ii)-(iii). Hence, the relations (I) pass to that limit and yield:
fx
i!

s
g := fxisg = argmaxy2Bi(!s ;zi ) ui(x

i0; y). 
Assertion (vi) Let i 2 I be given. For every (!; n) 2 PiNN , the fact that Cn is a
(n; )-equilibrium and Assumption A2 yield:
(I) fxniargn
i
(!)g = argmaxy2Bi(argni (!);zni ) ui(x
n
i0; y).
From Lemma 2-(ii)-(iii)-(iv), the relation (!; xi0; z

i ) = limn!1(arg
n
i (!); x
n
i0; z
n
i ) holds,
whereas, from Assumption A2 and ([8], p. 19), the correspondence (x; !; z) 2
R
L
+PiR
J 7! argmaxy2Bi(!;z) ui(x; y) is a continuous mapping, since ui and Bi are
continuous. Hence, passing to the limit into relations (I) yields a continuous map-
ping, ! 2 Pi 7! xi! := argmaxy2Bi(!;zi ) ui(x

i0; y), which, from Lemma 3-(v) and above,
is embedded into a continuous mapping, xi : ! 2 f0g[P

i 7! x

i!, i.e., x

i 2 X(

i ). 
Assertion (vii) Let i 2 I and xi 2 X(

i ) be given, along Lemma 3-(vi). Let 'i :
(x; !; z) 2 RL+PiR
J 7! argmaxy2Bi(!;z) ui(x; y) be dened on its domain. By the same
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token as for proving Assertion (vi), 'i and Ui : (x; !; z) 2 R
L
+PiR
J 7! ui(x; 'i(x; !; z))
are continuous mappings and, moreover, the relations ui(x

i0; x

i!) = Ui(x

i0; !; z

i ) and
ui(x
n
i0; x
n
i argn
i
(!)) = Ui(x
n
i0; arg
n
i (!); z
n
i ) hold, for every (!; n) 2 PiNN . Then, the uniform
continuity of ui and Ui on compact sets, and Lemma 3-(ii)-(iii)-(iv) yield:
(I) 8" > 0; 9N" 2 NN : 8n > N"; 8! 2 Pi,
j ui(x

i0; x

i!)  ui(x
n
i0; x
n
i argn
i
(!)) j +
P
s2S j ui(x

i0; x

i!

s
)  ui(x
n
i0; x
n
is) j < ".
Moreover, with C := (1+#S), we recall the following denitions, for every n 2 NN :
(II) Cu


i
i (x

i ) :=
R
!2Pi ui(x

i0; x

i!)di(!) + 
P
s2S ui(x

i0; x

is);
(III) uni (x
n
i ) :=
R
!2Pi ui(x
n
i0; x
n
i argn
i
(!))di(!) + 
P
s2S ui(x
n
i0; x
n
is).
Then, Lemma 4-(vii) results immediately from relations (I)-(II)-(III) above. 
Proof of Lemma 4 It is similar to that of Lemma 3, hence, left to the reader. 
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